Twisted atrioventricular connections in double inlet right ventricle: evaluation by magnetic resonance imaging

Twisted atrioventricular connections occur almost exclusively in the hearts with biventricular atrioventricular connections. Only one example of double inlet left ventricle has been illustrated in which the axes of the two atrioventricular valves crossed each other. We describe herein three patients, and one autopsied specimen, with double inlet right ventricle in which magnetic resonance imaging clearly demonstrated twisted atrioventricular connections

An atypical presentation of a common infection.

Case Report: A six-year-old girl presented with a one year history of painless, non-purulent conjunctivitis of her left eye which had been treated on two occasions with topical antibiotics with no effect

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious problems: a widespread implementation flaw and a deeper, more difficult to fix flaw with the EMV protocol itself. The first flaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this nonce. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The second problem was exposed by the above work. Independent of the random number quality, there is a protocol failure: the actual random number generated by the terminal can simply be replaced by one the attacker used earlier when capturing an authentication code from the card. This variant of the pre-play attack may be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and.

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious problems: a widespread implementation flaw and a deeper, more difficult to fix flaw with the EMV protocol itself. The first flaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this nonce. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The second problem was exposed by the above work. Independent of the random number quality, there is a protocol failure: the actual random number generated by the terminal can simply be replaced by one the attacker used earlier when capturing an authentication code from the card. This variant of the pre-play attack may be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and.

Measuring Accuracy of Automated Parsing and Categorization Tools and Processes in Digital Investigations

This work presents a method for the measurement of the accuracy of evidential artifact extraction and categorization tasks in digital forensic investigations. Instead of focusing on the measurement of accuracy and errors in the functions of digital forensic tools, this work proposes the application of information retrieval measurement techniques that allow the incorporation of errors introduced by tools and analysis processes. This method uses a `gold standard' that is the collection of evidential objects determined by a digital investigator from suspect data with an unknown ground truth. This work proposes that the accuracy of tools and investigation processes can be evaluated compared to the derived gold standard using common precision and recall values. Two example case studies are presented showing the measurement of the accuracy of automated analysis tools as compared to an in-depth analysis by an expert. It is shown that such measurement can allow investigators to determine changes in accuracy of their processes over time, and determine if such a change is caused by their tools or knowledge.Comment: 17 pages, 2 appendices, 1 figure, 5th International Conference on Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime; Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime, pp. 147-169, 201

PKSB1740-517: An ALMA view of the cold gas feeding a distant interacting young radio galaxy

Cold neutral gas is a key ingredient for growing the stellar and central black hole mass in galaxies throughout cosmic history. We have used the Atacama Large Millimetre Array (ALMA) to detect a rare example of redshifted $^{12}$CO(2-1) absorption in PKS B1740-517, a young ($t \sim 1.6 \times 10^{3}$ yr) and luminous ($L_{\rm 5 GHz} \sim 6.6 \times 10^{43}$ erg s$^{-1}$ ) radio galaxy at $z = 0.44$ that is undergoing a tidal interaction with at least one lower-mass companion. The coincident HI 21-cm and molecular absorption have very similar line profiles and reveal a reservoir of cold gas ($M_{\rm gas} \sim 10^{7} - 10^{8}$ M$_{\odot}$), likely distributed in a disc or ring within a few kiloparsecs of the nucleus. A separate HI component is kinematically distinct and has a very narrow line width ($\Delta{v}_{\rm FWHM} \lesssim 5$ km s$^{-1}$), consistent with a single diffuse cloud of cold ($T_{\rm k} \sim 100$ K) atomic gas. The $^{12}$CO(2-1) absorption is not associated with this component, which suggests that the cloud is either much smaller than 100 pc along our sight-line and/or located in low-metallicity gas that was possibly tidally stripped from the companion. We argue that the gas reservoir in PKS B1740-517 may have accreted onto the host galaxy $\sim$50 Myr before the young radio AGN was triggered, but has only recently reached the nucleus. This is consistent with the paradigm that powerful luminous radio galaxies are triggered by minor mergers and interactions with low-mass satellites and represent a brief, possibly recurrent, active phase in the life cycle of massive early type galaxies.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in MNRA